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Foreign State’s entanglement in anticompetitive conduct 
Marek Martyniszyn* 
 
 
Abstract 
Transnational competition cases pose numerous challenges— from accessing 
foreign-based evidence to effectively enforcing decisions or judgments in their 
aftermath. Some of such cases are quite special in that the underlying conduct 
involves or implicates a foreign State. This article makes an original contribution 
to the scholarship by filling the existing gap and developing a typology of State’s 
entanglement in conduct causing competitive harm abroad. It also examines the 
way in which foreign State’s involvement or implication can be addressed in the 
adversely affected forum. Moreover, the key broader considerations which need 
to inform policies and approaches toward such cases are identified and evaluated. 
It is argued that competitive harm resulting from commercial dealings should be 
pursued under competition laws regardless of the character of the parties involved, 
unless there are overriding reasons justifying abstention. States should not enjoy 
immunity for competitive harm resulting from their commercial dealings. 
Agencies and courts in the affected fora should strive to clarify this matter. A clear 
State’s policy on dealing with inbound competitive harm may also make foreign 
partners more receptive to concerns about policies which facilitate competitive 
harm which they may be pursuing.
  
                                                          
*  Lecturer in Law, Queen’s University Belfast, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom. Comments are gratefully 
received at m.martyniszyn@qub.ac.uk. Thanks to Jean Allain, Edward Cavanaugh, Imelda Maher, Mitsuo 
Matsushita, Spencer Waller and Bruce Wardhaugh for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. A version 
of this piece was presented at: a Symposium on International Trade Law and Policy Relating to Natural Resources, 
Energy and Environment – Perspectives to Sustainable Development (conveyed by Professors Mitsuo Matsushita 
and Thomas J. Schoenbaum and organized by the Institute for International Studies and Training), in Tokyo in 
March 2015; within the Renmin International Virtual Workshop series at the Renmin University of China School 
of Law, in May 2015; and at the Next Generation of Antitrust Scholars Conference organised by the New York 
University School of Law and the American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law, in January 2016. The 
author is grateful to participants for useful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies. 
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(1). Introduction  
In the interconnected world, the conduct of entities in one jurisdiction may, and often does, 
have direct effects in another. The same applies to competitive harm, which often stretches 
beyond one country and may even focus solely on foreign markets. As the international 
community has yet to develop a multilateral solution to transnational anticompetitive conduct,1 
it is currently being pursued by the competition agencies (which often coordinate their actions 
with foreign counterparts2) and / or private plaintiffs in the affected jurisdictions. 
Transnational competition cases pose numerous challenges— from accessing foreign-based 
evidence to effectively enforcing decisions or judgments in the aftermath. An additional layer 
of complexity arises when a foreign State becomes involved or implicated in the underlying 
anticompetitive conduct. The existing scholarship examines this phenomenon predominantly 
through two lenses. The first strand of research focuses on and investigates the defences and 
doctrines of abstention (such as foreign State compulsion or the act of state doctrine) which 
come to play in competition law cases involving States.3 The second strand analyses the 
applicability of domestic competition laws to anticompetitive acts and measures of a State and 
State-owned firms internally, within a home jurisdiction.4 
This article makes an original contribution to the scholarship by filling the existing gap and 
developing a typology of State’s entanglement in conduct causing competitive harm abroad. In 
Part 2 it identifies the key types of policies and measures, both inbound and outbound oriented, 
which lead to such harm on foreign markets, ranging from State’s purely commercial conduct 
to its core sovereign activities. In this process the article also distinguishes between potentially 
actionable State involvement and non-actionable facilitation, pointing to the limits of 
competition law and the need to seek remedies in other systems of law or beyond it. In order 
to facilitate a detailed analysis with wide resonance the typology is supplemented with 
examples of relevant cases drawn from various jurisdictions, showing that State entanglement 
in anticompetitive conduct is both not a matter of past and not a feature of only other than free 
market economies. Subsequently, in Part 3, the article examines the way in which a foreign 
State’s involvement or implication can be addressed in the adversely affected forum. Finally, 
in Part 4, it identifies and evaluates the key broader considerations which need to inform 
                                                          
1  There were numerous attempts to develop global competition law—from the discussions at the conference of 
the League of Nations in the 1920s, over inclusion of competition law in the later abandoned agreement 
establishing International Trade Organisation after the World War II (the Havana Charter), to more recent failed 
attempts to include competition law in the framework of the World Trade Organisation. For discussion see David 
J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (OUP 2010), 19-54, 101-107. 
2  See below notes 82-85 and the accompanying text. 
3  See, for example, Marek Martyniszyn, A Comparative Look on Foreign State Compulsion as a Defence in 
Antitrust Litigation, 8(2) Competition Law Review 143 (2012); Eric Blomme, State Action as a Defence Against 
81 and 82 EC, 30(2) World Competition 243 (2007); Fernando Castillo de la Torre, State Action Defence in EC 
Competition Law, 28(4) World Competition 407 (2005); Spencer Weber Waller, Suing OPEC, 64 University of 
Pittsburgh Law Review 105 (2002); Joseph P. Griffin, Special International Antitrust Doctrines and Defenses, 60 
Antitrust Law Journal 543 (1992); Spencer Weber Waller, et al., Special Defenses in International Antitrust 
Litigation (ABA Antitrust Section 1995). 
4 See, in particular, Eleanor M Fox and Deborah Healey, When the State Harms Competition―The Role for 
Competition Law, 79 Antitrust Law Journal 769 (2014), which was informed by a survey of 35 jurisdictions 
conducted in the framework of the UNCTAD Competition and Consumer Policies Branch’s Research Partnership 
Platform. See also contributions in Thomas Cheng, et al., Competition and the State (Stanford University Press 
2014); Malin Thunström, et al., State Liability Under the EC Treaty Arising From Anti-Competitive State 
Measures, 25(4) World Competition 515 (2002). 
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policies and approaches toward cases with foreign State entanglement (including some of the 
possible legal and extra-legal responses to adjudication in the affected forum). The State-
related defences available in competition cases, while identified, are not the focus of this 
contribution. Similarly, the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction is taken for granted. 
The article demonstrates that State involvement or implication— through a variety of 
measures— in anticompetitive conduct causing harm abroad remains both a topical and 
problematic issue, with significant practical consequences. It is argued that competitive harm 
resulting from commercial dealings should be pursued under competition laws regardless of 
the character of the party involved (be it a firm or a foreign State), unless there are overriding 
reasons justifying abstention (for example, relating to national security, or a State’s strategic 
interests). States should not enjoy immunity for competitive harm inflicted within other 
jurisdictions and resulting from their commercial dealings. Agencies and courts in the 
adversely affected fora should strive to clarify this matter. A clear State’s policy on dealing 
with inbound competitive harm may also make foreign partners more receptive to concerns 
about policies facilitating such harm which they may be pursuing. Extraterritorial enforcement 
in particularly sensitive, or allegedly borderline (commercial v sovereign) cases should be 
informed by broader considerations relating to the transfer of wealth resulting from 
transnational competitive harm and the possibility of adverse reactions of States affected by 
such enforcement. 
(2). How a state may be entangled in an antitrust case in a foreign jurisdiction? 
Various State and State-related actions and policies may lead to its entanglement in an antitrust 
case in a foreign jurisdiction. These can be divided into acts and policies which lead to or 
facilitate foreign harm, and those which were taken in reaction to a foreign investigation or 
adjudication in a given case (see Figure 1 below).5 This section focuses on the former category. 
Such acts and policies can be mapped out into a spectrum ranging from State’s own purely 
commercial to its core sovereign activities. Moreover, these actions be generally divided into 
outbound and inbound oriented activities. 
 
                                                          
5  Acts taken in a reaction to a foreign investigation or adjudication include submitting amicus curiae briefs to 
foreign courts, or enacting so-called blocking legislation in response to foreign proceedings. The latter category 
is discussed in Part 4 of this article. For analysis of the potential and the role fulfilled by amicus curiae briefs see 
Marek Martyniszyn, Foreign States’ Amicus Curiae Participation in U.S. Antitrust Cases, 61(4) Antitrust Bulletin 
611 (2016). 
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Figure 1 Ex ante and ex post State entanglement in an antitrust case in a foreign forum 
 
 
(a).  Outbound oriented activities 
First, a State itself—directly, or indirectly through its organs or State-owned (State trading) 
enterprises—may be involved in commercial activities. If this is the case and the conduct at 
stake causes competitive harm in some other jurisdiction, a State may be implicated or even 
become a defendant in a foreign forum. There is no logical reason why a foreign State, in its 
commercial dealings, should receive some special treatment as compared to other market 
participants. Recent comparative research on these issues shows that many jurisdictions subject 
their own State-owned enterprises to domestic competition laws.6 Moreover, most jurisdictions 
now follow a restrictive doctrine of State immunity, which limits immunity to governmental 
acts (acta de jure imperii), and does not extend any special protection from jurisdiction beyond 
that category.7 The Aluminium Imports case, from 1985, serves as a good illustration. The 
European Commission dealt with price-fixing and market-sharing of aluminium involving 
some Western European firms and foreign trade organisations from then socialist Eastern 
European States. In its decision, the Commission rejected any claims of State immunity, relying 
on the doctrine of restrictive immunity. It noted that even if the socialist entities ‘were 
indistinguishable under Socialist law from the State, no sovereign immunity would attach to 
their participation … since this was an exclusively commercial activity.’8 
 
                                                          
6  E. Fox and D. Healey, supra n. 4. 
7  For discussion see, for example, Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, (6th ed., CUP 2008) 704-08. The US 
formally embraced the restrictive doctrine already in 1952. See the letter from Jack Tate, an Acting Legal Adviser 
for the Secretary of State to the Attorney General, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of China, 
425 U.S. 682, App. 2 (1952). 
8  European Commission, 85/206/EEC, Decision of 19 December 1984, IV/26.870- Aluminium Imports from 
Eastern Europe (Aluminium Imports), OJ L 92, 1 (1985), 9.2. 
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Figure 2  State entanglement in anticompetitive conduct: outbound oriented activities 
 
 
State immunity is a principle of international law. Related to it are the concepts of non-
justiciability or act of State.9 These are doctrines of domestic law recognized by some 
jurisdictions, which often come to play in cases raising State immunity. Both doctrines reflect 
the fact that domestic courts lack competence to sit in judgment on international activities of 
sovereign foreign States.10 The interplay between State immunity, non-justiciability, and act of 
State—in the antitrust context—is well-illustrated by the private suits brought against the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the United States. Although, in 
one of the earlier cases a district court dismissed the suit relying on the principle of State 
immunity, the Appeal Court affirmed the judgment on the basis of the act of State doctrine, 
which it considered a prudential doctrine, allowing courts to avoid ‘judicial action in sensitive 
areas’.11 In the more recent antitrust challenge to OPEC in the US, the lower court dismissed 
the suit relying on the act of State doctrine and non-justiciability.12 This outcome was 
confirmed on appeal on the basis of non-justiciability only.13 State immunity was not raised. 
The general inference from these cases is that domestic courts are likely to find themselves not 
competent, on a non-justiciability basis, to adjudicate on international dealings of foreign 
States, if the underlying activities are not considered commercial. 
                                                          
9  The principle of non-justiciability, in essence, applies when there is no legal standard allowing for 
determination of the issue in question, or when it falls within the competence of the government and concerns 
policy choices. In the US, it is known as the political question doctrine. The act of state doctrine provides that 
courts shall not examine validity of acts of foreign States within the boundaries of their territories. For a review 
of the act of State doctrine and non-justiciability in a comparative context see Marek Martyniszyn, Avoidance 
Techniques: State Related Defences in International Antitrust Cases (CCP Working Paper No. 11-2, 2011), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1782888 (accessed 20 Dec. 2016).  
10  M. N. Shaw, supra n. 7, at 699. 
11  Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC (IAM II), 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir. 1981). 
12  In re Refined Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation (RPP), 649 F.Supp.2d 572 (S.D. Tex. 2009). 
13  Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938 (5th Cir. 2011). 
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The next activity potentially implicating a foreign State is that of facilitation. Through its 
actions and policies a State may be facilitating or even encouraging outbound anticompetitive 
conduct. The classic and almost universally occurring example is the case of export cartels’ 
exemptions. Virtually all States make their competition laws applicable only to conduct 
(domestic or foreign) harming domestic markets. This means that export cartels (that is, cartels 
harming only foreign markets) do not face any threat in their domestic fora. They enjoy a safe 
harbour at home and may safely reap supra-competitive profits from foreign markets.14 
Similarly, a State may more broadly limit the reach of its own antitrust laws so that entities 
operating in the forum are shielded from domestic challenges relating to any competitive harm 
inflicted abroad. The most prominent example is the US 1982 Foreign Trade Antitrust 
Improvements Act (FTAIA)15 which ‘cut back the reach of the Sherman Act … principally to 
protect US sellers from challenges … for their activity abroad’.16 Policies facilitating outbound 
anticompetitive conduct may be even more nuanced. It may be a matter of a very lax or under-
enforced competition regime, which allows for activities that, while also negatively affecting 
the domestic market, lead to predominantly foreign harm due to a chiefly outward-focused 
domestic economy or its important sector. Potash production in Canada provides a good 
illustration. Canada is the world leading producer of potash. It sells most of it through an export 
cartel,17 which allegedly coordinates prices with other potash producers. Simultaneously, less 
than five per cent of Canadian potash is sold domestically. Even if the Canadian market is also 
affected by higher potash prices, the domestic economy as a whole is likely to benefit greatly, 
even if only through the collected royalties and profit taxes of its exports.18 
Similar—albeit subtler—is the case of merger review. A State may allow for concentrations 
which cause no or little harm on the domestic market, while leading to competitive harm on 
foreign markets. Motivations may be various, including a protectionist attempt to strengthen 
the competitive position of domestic industry versus foreign competitors.19 Often such an 
outcome is a corollary of the fact that the domestic agencies are mandated to consider only the 
domestic, rather than the overall effects of a concentration. Moreover, while cooperation 
between competition agencies in merger cases is growing, it does not rule out the possibility 
of divergent outcomes of the review. The attempted concentration between South African 
Gencor and Lonrho, cleared by the South African authorities and blocked by the European 
Commission may serve as an illustration.20 The attempted merger between General Electric 
                                                          
14  For discussion of export cartels in more details see Marek Martyniszyn, Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target 
Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law, 15(1) Journal of International Economic Law 181 (2012); 
D. Daniel Sokol, What do We Really Know About Export Cartels and What is the Appropriate Solution?, 4(4) 
Journal of Competition Law and Economics 967 (2008). 
15  15 U.S.C. § 6(a). 
16  Eleanor M. Fox and Daniel A. Crane, Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law (Thomson/West 2010) 
455. 
17  Under subsection 45(5) of the Canadian Competition Act, agreements or arrangements relating only to the 
export of products from Canada are permitted, subject to certain exceptions. 
18  For discussion of the potash cartel see Frederic Jenny, Export Cartels in Primary Products: The Potash Case 
in Perspective in Simon J. Evenett and Frederic Jenny (eds), Trade, Competition, and the Pricing of Commodities 
(Centre for Economic Policy Research 2012). 
19  Ariel Ezrachi, Globalization of Merger Control: A Look at Bilateral Cooperation through the GE/Honeywell 
Case, 14 Florida Journal of International Law 397 (2001), at 406-08. 
20  European Commission, 97/26/EC, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the Common 
Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, IV/M.619- Gencor, OJ L11, 30-72 (1996); Case T-102/96, 
Gencor Ltd v. Commission, [1999] ECR II-753; Case T-210/01, General Electric Co. v. Commission, [1999] ECR 
II-753. 
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and Honeywell, which was hailed to be the largest industrial merger in the world’s history—
cleared by the US and Canadian authorities, was subsequently prohibited by the European 
Commission21—remains the prime example of persisting differences between regimes and it 
gave impetus to much of the cooperation between agencies which followed. 
However, cases involving foreign State facilitation typically either do not end up in foreign 
courts or do not implicate a foreign State itself. This is because facilitation, or even 
encouragement will be seen, in the majority of cases, as an economic policy—which is a 
sovereign choice. As such, economic policies are generally non-actionable in foreign fora. 
They will also not violate any international ‘competition’ norms since any consensus in this 
area relates only to certain types of private conduct, not to State policies. However, some such 
policies may violate voluntarily assumed, treaty-based obligations (for example, under WTO 
agreements). In this regard, it is worth noting that a broad consensus has already emerged as to 
the harmful nature of international hardcore cartels.22 Yet, these are always defined as private, 
prohibited agreements and not cartels created by States.23 Also, the consensus does not extend 
to condemnation of export cartels, even those which are private agreements.  
Facilitation is a very broad and diversified category of acts. Yet a State may go further than 
facilitating anticompetitive conduct. It may eliminate scope for autonomous conduct in certain 
aspects on a particular market, compelling entities involved to follow the given instructions 
and to act anticompetitively. For example, a State may create a compulsory export cartel and 
set an export price from which firms will not be permitted to deviate. The Norwegian gas export 
cartel is a good example. From about 1989, Norwegian natural gas producers were compelled 
by the Norwegian government to sell gas jointly through a specially created body—Gas 
Negotiation Committee (GFU), which allegedly fixed prices and the quantities sold. The 
GFU’s main task was to negotiate supply contracts with buyers located in the EU.24 
Noteworthy, gas from Norway accounted for about ten per cent of EU gas consumption. The 
European Commission open an investigation. Initially the Norwegian government argued that 
EU competition law should not be applied as the Norwegian gas producers were compelled to 
sell gas through the GFU.25 Later the investigation prompted a political response. Norway 
issued a royal decree discontinuing the GFU scheme in relation to the EU. This led to settling 
of the case, with the gas companies offering various commitments.26 Although the scheme was 
                                                          
21  European Commission, 2004/134/EC, Decision Declaring a Concentration to be Incompatible with the 
Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreement, COMP/M.2220- General Electric/Honeywell, OJ 
L48, 1-85 (2001). 
22  The 1998 Recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defines 
hardcore cartels as anticompetitive agreements, concerted practices or an arrangements among competitors to fix 
prices, submit collusive tenders, restrict outputs, or share markets. OECD, Recommendation of the Council 
Concerning Effective Action Against Hard Core Cartels, C(98)35/FINAL (March 1998), I(A)2(a), 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/39/4/2350130.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
23  For example, the 1998 OECD Recommendation specifies that the category of the condemned agreements 
‘does not include agreements, concerted practices, or arrangements that (i) are reasonably related to the lawful 
realisation of cost-reducing or output-enhancing efficiencies, (ii) are excluded directly or indirectly from the 
coverage of a Member country’s own laws, or (iii) are authorised in accordance with those laws.’ ibid, at I(A)2(b). 
24  Maarit Lindroos, et al., Liberalisation of European Gas Markets: Commission settles GFU case with 
Norwegian gas producers, 3 Competition Policy Newsletter 50 (2002), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/cpn/2002_3_50.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
25  Ibid.  
26  European Commission, IP/02/1084, Commission successfully settles GFU case with Norwegian gas producers 
(17 July 2002), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-02-1084_en.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
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dismantled, it serves as a good illustration of a compelled, outbound-oriented, anticompetitive 
conduct. 
While the principle of compelling is straight-forward,27 what actually amounts to compulsion 
may be perceived differently in different legal cultures. In Western regimes, generally 
characterized by a strong rule of law and transparent processes and application of rules, only a 
clear and binding order of a State to act in a particular way under a credible threat of sanctions 
is likely to qualify. However, in one case in past the US authorities recognized de jure non-
binding directives as sufficient evidence of compulsion.28 In other jurisdictions, governmental 
guidance or even State pressure may be used to achieve the same end—de facto compelling 
conduct. Such a clash of cultures surfaced prominently in the past in the US-Japan context,29 
and more recently in the private actions in the US against Chinese export cartels.30  
As long as the entities involved are not actually compelled to act anticompetitively, there is no 
reason why they could not be challenged and sanctioned in the harmed jurisdictions. Where 
compulsion is established, the role of competition law—versus the entities directly involved—
ends. The defence should be applied carefully to limit possible abuse. Its lax application would 
create incentives for foreign entities to lobby their home State in order to secure either—
ex ante—an act compelling their earlier-agreed outbound anticompetitive actions, or—ex 
post—a statement to that effect, in other to enable reliance on the defence in foreign fora. In 
Vitamin C—a case involving a Chinese price-fixing export cartel—a US district court, when 
faced with contradicting factual records considered the Chinese official assertion of 
compulsion, submitted directly to the court by means of amicus curiae briefs, to be ‘a post-hoc 
attempt to shield defendants’ conduct from antitrust scrutiny.’31 However, on appeal the 
judgement in favour of plaintiffs was vacated.32 In September 2016 the Court of Appeals found 
itself bound to defer to the official Chinese representations, despite the reservations made by 
the lower court.33 In effect, it held that the defendants were compelled by the Chinese 
                                                          
27  See further M. Martyniszyn, supra n. 3. 
28  That was the case of Japanese auto restraints in the early 1980s. The US car industry was struggling with 
import competition, especially from Japan. In response, Japan introduced an oversight system to limit exports. 
This was to be achieved by means of de jure non-binding directives. Non-compliance was to lead to introduction 
of licencing, fines, and other sanctions. The potential application of US antitrust laws to the scheme was identified 
as a potential difficulty. Yet, the US Attorney General reassured the Japanese side that in the view of the 
Department of Justice the adopted measure would not give rise to violations of US antitrust laws and the 
compliance with such limitations would be viewed as having been compelled by Japan. 'Correspondence Between 
the U.S. Attorney General and Ambassador of Japan on U.S. Antitrust Laws and Japan’s Restraints on Automobile 
Exports, reprinted in', U.S. Import Weekly (BNA), 13 May 1981. For in-depth analysis of this case see Spencer 
Weber Waller, Redefining the Foreign Compulsion Defense in U.S. Antitrust Law: The Japanese Auto Restraints 
and Beyond, 14 Law and Policy in International Business 747 (1982). 
29  That was particularly the case in Matsushita, a private action in the US against Japanese TV manufacturers, 
who argued that their conduct was compelled by the authorities. The case made its way to the Supreme Court. 
Japanese government, in an amicus curiae intervention, supported defendants. Sadly, the Court did not address 
the issue of compulsion after finding that the alleged conduct did not cause injury to the plaintiffs. Matsushita 
Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
30  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation 2016 WL 5017312 (2nd Cir. 2016); Animal Science Products v. China 
Nat. Metals & Minerals Import & Export Corp., 702 F. Supp. 2d 320 (D.N.J. 2010); Resco Products v. Bosai 
Minerals Group, 2010-1 Trade Cases P 77,061 (W.D. Pa. 2010). 
31  In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 810 F.Supp.2d 522, 552 (E.D.N.Y. 2011). 
32 In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 2016 WL 5017312 (2nd Cir. 2016). 
33 That said, the Court noted that such deference need not be inappropriate when there is no documentary 
evidence or reference of law supporting the proffered interpretation of foreign state’s own laws. Id. at 9, n 8. 
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authorities to engage in price-fixing and that the lower court erred by not abstaining from 
adjudication on international comity basis.  
Finally, a State may manage its own natural resources in a manner which negatively affects 
their prices on world markets, for example, by limiting the pace or scope of exploitation. Such 
changes, in certain circumstances, may be seen as anticompetitive. That said, the traditional 
view is that States have complete sovereignty over their natural resources.34 The sovereignty 
encompasses the notion of control, and therefore includes also practical decisions on whether 
to extract a particular resource and, if so—how to manage that process, removing such 
decisions from the foreign antitrust purview. In the antitrust context, this view was restated by 
a US district court in a litigation challenging OPEC—itself an inter-governmental 
organisation—and its member States.35 A similar view was expressed by the European 
Commission which recognized that while some OPEC’s activities are cartel-like, they also 
relate to management of exhaustible resources and hence they are not purely commercial and 
are not challengeable under competition laws.36 
Management of natural resources may cover the strategic decisions on the scale and volume of 
extraction, exploitation. However, implementation of State’s long-standing extraction-
management policy is very different from a situation in which a State grants its organ or State-
owned enterprise a licence to extract a particular resource, without any underlying exploitation 
plan and subsequently that entity joins an international price-fixing cartel or abuses its 
dominant position. While the first case is clearly sovereign activity, there is no particular reason 
why the latter two cases should not be challenged and sanctioned in harmed jurisdictions as 
commercial and anticompetitive. The key difficulty lies in delineating the sovereign decisions 
and policies concerning the management of natural resources from the State’s commercial 
activities. Yet, there may be cases, in which such distinction can be made. For example, this 
should not present a difficulty in the ongoing GAZPROM case—a European Commission’s 
investigation of GAZPROM practices, allegedly including abuse of its dominant position in 
the EU.37 Categorisation of the underlying conduct should not be problematic given numerous 
reassurances of the firm’s top executives of its commercially-driven character and pricing 
strategy.38 
Cases involving management of natural resources often require close analysis of the factual 
framework to draw the distinction between sovereign and commercial acts. For example, in a 
recent potash cartel case a US court found a Belarusian State agency’s decision to reduce potash 
exports to be a sovereign, rather than commercial one. In effect, the entity was entitled to 
                                                          
34  For discussion of permanent sovereignty over natural recourses and its emergence as a principle of 
international law see Nico J. Schrijver, Natural Resources, Permanent Sovereignty over in Rüdiger Wolfrum (ed), 
The Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (OUP 2010). 
35  ‘The control over a nation's natural resources stems from the nature of sovereignty. By necessity and by 
traditional recognition, each nation is its own master in respect to its physical attributes. The defendants' control 
over their oil resources is an especially sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue-
producing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations' peoples.’ Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC (IAM I), 
477 F.Supp. 553, 568 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
36  European Commission, EC Competition Policy and the Motor Fuel Sector, MEMO/00/55 (20 September 
2000), 2, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/00/55 (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
37  European Commission, IP/12/937, Antitrust: Commission Opens Proceedings Against Gazprom (4 
September 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-937_en.htm (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
38  See, for example, Alexander Medvedev, 'Is Gazprom’s Strategy Political?', Europe’s World, Summer 2008, 
http://www.europesworld.org/portals/0/PDF_version/EW9_FINAL_ENG.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
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immunity from suit. Simultaneously, the court did not extend any foreign State-related 
protection to BPC Minsk—an exclusive international distributor for that Belarussian entity and 
another Russian potash producing company, jointly owned by the two entities—since it found 
no evidence showing that the involved acts were those of, or compelled by, Belarus. Hence, 
BPC Minsk was able to face consequences for its participation in the coordinated supply 
restrictions and price manipulations.39 
(b).  Inbound oriented activities 
The types of acts and policies discussed so far may, directly or indirectly, relate to competitive 
harm accompanying different types of predominantly outbound economic activities. While 
outbound conduct and selling is what typically leads to a legal challenge in a foreign 
jurisdiction, there may be inbound-oriented acts and policies, related to buying, which may 
cause competitive harm on foreign markets. That is the case of buyers’ cartels (buying 
consortia, clubbing) and importers’ cooperation, including boycotts.40 Embargoes constitute 
another category of inbound-focused acts potentially causing competitive harm abroad. 
 
Figure 3 State’s entanglement in anticompetitive conduct: inbound oriented activities 
 
 
Buying consortia or alliances are arrangements between buyers to pursue collaborative 
purchasing. They can take the form of either consolidated buying—with separate entities 
buying jointly— or of the establishment of formal ties—such as joint ventures. In many cases 
such arrangements will not raise foreign antitrust concerns. Yet, if a particular State is a 
sufficiently important purchaser of a given commodity or a resource, a domestic buyers’ cartel 
may be able to exert sufficient pressure on foreign suppliers to depress prices and benefit from 
                                                          
39  In re Potash Antitrust Litigation, 686 F.Supp.2d 816 (N.D. Ill. 2010). 
40  For general discussion of buying consortia and buyers cartels see Peter C Carstensen, Buyer cartels versus 
buying groups: legal distinctions, competitive realities, and antitrust policy, 1 William & Mary Business Law 
Review 1 (2010). See further Jing Hao, Buyers ‘Cartels: An Empirical Study of Prevalence and Economic 
Characteristics (Purdue University 2011). 
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what economists call a monopsony rent.41 Such behaviour between private parties, in a 
domestic context, would normally be prohibited under competition laws.42 The transnational 
context adds an additional layer of complexity, yet it does not rule out such cases (so long as 
the domestic jurisdictional provisions allow for it43). In the past, one such case involved a 
Japanese buyers’ cartel among paper manufacturers created in order to countervail an 
international cartel of wood chip suppliers (which, nota bene, included a US export cartel, duly 
registered as a Webb-Pomerene association).44 The US cartel successfully sued, in the US, to 
enjoin the Japanese importers which attempted to depress prices and boycotted them. Another 
case involved a Japanese import cartel which aimed to fix prices of Alaskan crabs and other 
seafood. The Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice brought a civil case against 
the Japanese firm, which was ultimately settled by a consent decree.45 A more recent case 
involving a buyers’ cartel—factually, but not legally—was Telmex. While the US, in the WTO 
framework, challenged certain Mexican rules concerning export of phone termination services 
(an export cartel), the arrangement involved also a buyers’ cartel, which operation apparently 
originally led to the involvement of the US Trade Representative.46 The Mexican operator, as 
the ring-leader, was able to fix prices at which phone termination services in the US would be 
purchased by all Mexican operators. Neven and Mavroidis suggest that the US might have 
considered it had a stronger case against the export cartel and that its dismantling would also 
result in dissolution of the buyers’ cartel.47 
The legal position of foreign buying consortia under competition laws is bound to be analysed 
more closely in light of the growing interest, in various parts of the world, in different forms 
of import cooperation in relation to fossil fuel resources, especially gas. This is particularly 
visible in the Asian countries, which absorb a large part of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
exports and which would like to secure better contract terms and pricing. First joint purchases 
                                                          
41  The same outcome can be achieved if the buying State imposes a tariff on the imported commodity/resource. 
In such a case instead of the buyers’ cartel, the State coffers benefit from the monopsony rent. Frederic M Scherer, 
Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy (Brookings Institution 1994) 55-56. 
42  As Waller and Fiebig point out, in the United States the principal decision of the Supreme Court holding price 
fixing to be illegal per se involved an agreement between buyers, not sellers. United States v. Socony-Vacuum 
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 60 S. Ct. 811, 84 L. Ed. 1129 (1940), reh'g denied, 310 U.S. 658, 60 S. Ct. 1091, 84 L. Ed. 
1421 (1940). See further Spencer Weber Waller and Andre Fiebig, Antitrust and American Business Abroad (West 
Group 2014) § 10:3. In regimes which do not follow the per se approach the overall effect of a joint buying 
agreement would be analysed. For example, in Gottrup-Klim the European Court of Justice held that a joint 
purchasing agreement which prohibited its members from participating in other forms of cooperative buying did 
not necessarily restrict competition and it might, in fact, have beneficial effects on competition. Case C-250/92 
Gottrup-Klim Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landsbrugs Grovvareselskab AmbA, [1994] ECR I-5641, paras 32-
34. 
43  It is worth recalling that in its 1988 International operations Guidelines the US DoJ had restrained itself from 
challenging foreign conduct harming US exporters, such as foreign buyers’ cartels. Department of Justice, 
Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (1988), 55 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 
No. 1391, n 159. In 1992 the DoJ reverted to its earlier, more expansive approach. US Department of Justice, 
'ustice Department Will Challenge Foreign Restraints on U.S. Exports Under Antitrust Laws, 3 April 1992, 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/1992/211137.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). For analysis see 
Marina Lao, Jurisdictional Reach of the US Antitrust Laws: Yokosuka and Yokota, and Footnote 159 Scenarios, 
46 Rutgers Law Review 821 (1993). 
44  Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P64,774 (N.D. California 1982). 
45  United States v. C. Itoh & Co., Ltd., 1982-83 Trade Cas. (CCH) P65,010 (W.D. Washington 1982). 
46  Philip Marsden, Trade and Competition: WTO decides first competition case - with disappointing results, 
Competition Law Insight (2004), at 3, http://www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/conferences/regulated-
industries/R04_marsden.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
47  See Damien J Neven and Petros C Mavroidis, El mess in TELMEX: a comment on Mexico-measures affecting 
telecommunications services, 5(2) World Trade Review 271 (2006), at 276. 
12 
 
have already taken place.48 On top of this sprouting cooperation, the media reports ongoing 
discussions on creating a broader LNG buying club among Asian buyers.49 Similar ideas of 
joint buying are being considered in the EU. In April 2014, Donald Tusk—then Polish Prime 
Minister, now the President of the European Council—called on the EU to ‘develop a 
mechanism for jointly negotiating energy contracts with Russia’.50 It seems that currently the 
discussion has shifted towards exploring possibilities of private joint purchasing schemes.51 In 
the EU, such ideas are considered in an attempt to seek more equal footing in negotiations with 
Gazprom, which is allegedly selling gas to the EU at often much inflated prices (and which 
practises are currently under investigation52). From a competition law perspective, if any joint 
purchasing activities were to reach a sufficiently large scale to exert significant market power, 
they may become a focus of foreign antitrust scrutiny in allegedly harmed exporting countries. 
Private joint buying agreements do not pose any additional competition law challenge, beyond 
the usual hurdles of transnational enforcement. The situation is quite different in case of a 
compelled centralized buying organized by the importing State. Such schemes, falling within 
the broad range of economic policies, would not be actionable under foreign competition laws, 
yet they could potentially violate voluntarily assumed treaty-based obligations. Purely private 
and compelled joint buying arrangements mark the opposing ends of the spectrum. There may 
be other, intermediate solutions. For example, a State may also put in place a joint buying 
scheme which, while limiting competition, does not exclude it altogether. In such cases, per 
analogy to the State compulsion defence, entities involved would still be responsible for their 
conduct beyond that mandated by the State. There may also be potentially more nuanced 
arrangements, which while ultimately involving authorities’ approval, rely on market forces. 
For example, in the EU, the Euratom Supply Agency has an exclusive right to conclude 
                                                          
48  In 2014, State-run Korea Gas Corporation (KOGAS), reportedly the world’s largest LNG buyer, teamed up 
for a joint gas purchase with State-run Japan Oil, Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC). Jane Chung, 
'Japan firm buy gas together; more joint deals to come', Reuters, 24 March 2014, http://reut.rs/1gsxphc (accessed 
20 Dec. 2016). KOGAS was reported planning to begin joint purchases with Tokyo Gas Corporation. Osamu 
Tsukimori and James Topham, Tokyo Gas, Kogas may start joint gas purchases, investments, Reuters, 25 
September 2014, http://af.reuters.com/article/energyOilNews/idAFL3N0RQ20420140925 (accessed 20 Dec. 
2016). Japanese Tokyo Electric Power Corporation (Tepco) and Chubu Electric Power Corporation (Chubu)—
world’s second and third biggest LNG buyers—were recently, in January 2015, reported to be awaiting a 
government’s approval to jointly tender for gas. Sarah McFarlane and Oleg Vukmanovic, Tepco, Chubu expected 
to buy 6 LNG cargoes from Vitol, GDF Suez-traders, Reuters, 23 January 2015, http://reut.rs/1EBtjMk (accessed 
20 Dec. 2016). Moreover, in March 2014 Japanese Chubu signed an agreement with India’s GAIL to consider 
joint purchasing of LNG. Osamu Tsukimori, Japan's Chubu in deal with India's GAIL to consider joint LNG buy, 
Reuters, 24 March 2014, http://reut.rs/1juNbWx (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
49  J. Chung, supra n. 48. 
50  Donald Tusk, A united Europe can end Russia’s energy stranglehold, Financial Times, 21 April 2014, 
http://on.ft.com/1ffQ7na (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). Similar idea, of various scope, have been circulating in the EU 
for some time. For a proposal to have the governments of the Visegrad countries set up a gas buyers’ consortium 
see Pavlo Szalai, Central Europe's Energy Security After Nabucco (CEPI Policy Brief 2013), 
http://www.cepolicy.org/sites/cepolicy.org/files/attachments/central_europes_energy_security_after_nabucco_fi
nal_0.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
51  The EU’s Energy Commissioner Miguel Arias Cañete was quoted saying that ‘We [the Commission] are not 
discussing the idea of the Commission buying on behalf of nation states. Not at all … The question is whether we 
could generate interest among private companies to consider the possibility of working together.’ Christian Oliver, 
'New EU energy chief shifts focus to building common power market', Financial Times, 13 November 2014, 
http://on.ft.com/1v6Ago1 (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). See further European Commission, Energy Union Package: 
A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate Change Policy, 
COM(2015) 80 final (25 February 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/docs/energyunion_en.pdf 
(accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
52  See notes 37-38 and accompanying text. 
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contracts relating to trade in nuclear materials (including ores).53 That said, normally the price 
negotiations take place directly between the interested parties,54 although the Agency does not 
have to approve the proposed pricing.55  
The last type of inbound-oriented acts and policies potentially harming foreign markets are 
State-enacted embargoes. As sovereign acts in nature, they are not actionable under foreign 
competition laws. A useful competition law related example is the US embargo on the 
importation of foreign uranium in the 1960s. The embargo was introduced in order to protect 
and develop the US domestic uranium industry. It was lobbied for by the US uranium 
producers. Before the cut-off, two-thirds of uranium produced in the West was absorbed by the 
US. The embargo led to a significant drop in uranium prices on the world market, and then to 
creation of an international uranium cartel under the patronage of a number of States.56 
This section has identified and mapped out various actions and policies, both outbound and 
inbound oriented, potentially leading to a State’s entanglement in antitrust proceedings in a 
foreign forum. A general distinction was drawn between various commercial and sovereign 
activities of a State. The following section builds on it and asks the question of how such 
involvement or implication can be addressed in the harmed jurisdiction. 
(3). How a foreign state’s entanglement can be addressed in the adversely affected forum? 
The previous section identified different types of actions and policies potentially leading to a 
foreign State’s entanglement in an antitrust case. This section looks into the ways in which 
such entanglement can be addressed in the host state. 
First, a distinction needs to be made between cases involving competitive harm caused by 
commercial conduct and other situations. As explained above, there is no general legal 
justification as to why a commercial activity causing competitive harm in the domestic market 
should avoid antitrust scrutiny, or benefit from a competition law exemption. An involvement 
of, for example, a State-owned enterprise should make no difference. The situation is likely to 
be more complicated if, instead of a foreign State-owned firm, one of the alleged violators is a 
foreign State itself. This raises a question of whether provisions of a particular competition law 
regime would be at all applicable. The answer in the negative would mean that a particular 
regime implicitly permits for anticompetitive commercial activities of a foreign State in the 
forum— generally an unacceptable conclusion. 
In the US, this issue was touched upon in Pfizer.57 The question was whether a foreign 
government was a ‘person’ within the meaning of Section 4 of the Clayton Act, enabling it to 
bring a private suit for treble damages. While the case concerned the possibility of bringing a 
suit, the interpretation of the term ‘person’ is important as Section 4 of the Clayton Act is an 
unchanged re-enactment of Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which specifies to whom 
                                                          
53  Art 52(2)(b) of the Euratom Treaty.  
54  If the Agency agrees with the reached agreement, it will conclude the contract by co-signing it. André Bouquet, 
How current are Euratom provisions on nuclear supply and ownership in view of the European Union's 
enlargement?, 68 Nuclear Law Bulletin 7 (2001), at 9-10. 
55  Art 67-69 of the Euratom Treaty. See also A. Bouquet, supra n. 54, at 22-23. 
56  See generally Douglas E. Rosenthal and William M. Knighton, National Laws and International Commerce: 
the Problem of Extraterritoriality (the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Routledge & Kegan Paul 1982) 20. 
57  Pfizer Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978). 
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prohibitions contained in the Sherman Act apply. In Pfizer the US Supreme Court found that 
the definition of the word ‘person’ was ‘inclusive rather than exclusive, and does not by itself 
imply that a foreign government, any more than a natural person, falls without its bounds.’58 
Yet, notwithstanding Pfizer, in one of the OPEC cases a district court held that a foreign State 
cannot be a defendant in an antitrust case,59 albeit the underlying logic adopted by the Court 
was arguably flawed.60 Hovenkamp shows that neither statutes, nor their legislative history 
support a restrictive reading, removing foreign States’ commercial conduct from the scrutiny 
under antitrust laws.61 More recently, in Flamingo Industries, a case dealing with an issue of 
antitrust liability of a US Postal Service as an arm of a federal government, the Supreme Court 
observed that ‘corporate or governmental status in most instances is not a bar to the imposition 
of liability on an entity.’62 
The EU competition law regime relies on the concept of an ‘undertaking’. The European Court 
of Justice takes a functional approach in its interpretation. It is concerned with the activity at 
stake, not the nature of the entity involved. In Höfner the Court clarified that ‘the concept of 
an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity, regardless of the 
legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed.’63 As mentioned above, in 
Aluminium Imports the European Commission did not see a problem in applying EU 
competition law provisions to commercial activities of foreign entities, even if they were to be 
indistinguishable from their home State under foreign law.64 In Cali, the Court of Justice noted 
that for the sake of application of the EU competition rules a distinction needs to be drawn 
between a State acting qua State, ‘in the exercise of official authority and that where it carries 
on economic activities of an industrial or commercial nature by offering goods or services on 
the market’.65 EU competition law applies to the latter, but not to the former. 
It may be difficult to differentiate clearly between situations where a foreign State is involved 
in commercial activities and where it is acting in its sovereign capacity, but such an effort 
should be made. Antitrust agencies and courts in the adversely affected fora should not shy 
away from looking into commercial activities of a foreign State. Bringing such cases can not 
only reinstate competition on the market, or redress the suffered harm. An assertion of a clear 
policy towards competitive harm arising from all types of commercial conduct may also make 
foreign partners more receptive to concerns about policies facilitating such harm which they 
may be pursuing. For example in the GFU case, the European Commission was able to address 
what was essentially a State-created compulsory gas export cartel.66 Noteworthy, no fines were 
imposed in GFU. Settlements of cases implicating foreign States, also without imposition of 
fines if warranted, may be one of the ways in which domestic markets can be safeguarded and 
the pro-competitive signals sent, without excessive inter-State controversies. 
                                                          
58  Ibid, at 312, n 9. 
59  IAM I, supra n. 35, at 570-72. 
60  In this vein, for example, Herbert Hovenkamp, Can a Foreign Sovereign Be an Antitrust Defendant, 32 
Syracuse Law Review 879 (1981), at 898. 
61  Ibid. 
62  United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries, 540 U.S. 736, 744-45 (2004). 
63  Case C-41/90, Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v. Macrotron GmbH, [1991] ECR I-1979, para 21. 
64  See above note 8 and accompanying text. 
65  Case C-343/95, Diego Calì & Figli v. Servizi ecologici porto di Genova SpA (SEPG), [1997] ECR I-1547, 
para 16. 
66  See above notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 
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Some cases involving or implicating a foreign State may be particularly sensitive. They may 
raise considerations relating to the affected State’s strategic interests or even its security. This 
is where the distinction between public and private enforcement becomes particularly relevant. 
The competition agencies have discretion in relation to their enforcement priorities. They make 
conscious choices when deciding whether a particular, potentially sensitive, case should be 
brought. They can and should be presumed to consider wider implications both before 
launching an investigation and before making a final decision. To illustrate, Sir Leon Brittan, 
when he was the EU Competition Commissioner, once observed ‘a Commission decision on 
competition policy reflects the totality of the Commission’s views and policies. My colleague 
in charge of external relations sits near me in Commission when decisions are taken and his 
department talks to mine.’67 Therefore, potentially controversial investigations are unlikely to 
be launched without prior factoring in of the wider context.68 Moreover, agencies may also 
avail of the existing inter-agency or even inter-governmental channels to resolve or iron-out 
any sensitive issues. One can only speculate on how many State-related competition concerns 
have been addressed extralegally, through dialogue between States, as negotiation remains the 
primary means of dispute settlement between States. 
The case of private enforcement is altogether different. Private plaintiffs’ primary concerns are 
the likelihood and the level of a damages award and probability of its satisfaction. If a private 
suit challenges foreign sovereign activity, the State-related defences will come into play to 
appropriately shield the foreign State. Such defences will, of course, also apply in case of an 
ill-conceived public enforcement, challenging foreign sovereign activity. Moreover, in all such 
cases foreign States—whenever concerned— should be permitted to and may consider 
communicating their views directly to the hearing court, as it has been practised since the late 
1970s in the US.69 Any such representations should be accorded a high level of deference, as 
long as they are not contradicted by admissible evidence. In cases warranting judicial 
abstention from adjudication on the broader security or strategic interests’ grounds, the forum’s 
executive should use amicus briefs to communicate any such reasons to the relevant courts. 
That was the case, for example, in the recent challenge to OPEC in the US, in which the US 
Departments of Justice, State, Treasury, and Energy filed a joint brief underlying the sovereign 
nature of the decisions concerning exploitation of natural resources, challenged by the plaintiffs 
in the private suit.70 Domestic legal frameworks should make judicial abstention in such rare 
cases possible. 
                                                          
67  Leon Brittan, Competition Policy and Merger Control in the Single European Market (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) 16-17.  
68  In the EU context the College of Commissioners as a whole adopts most formal decisions (including decisions 
finding an infringement) in line with the principle of collegiality enshrined in art 17(6) of the Treaty on European 
Union). However, the decision-making power in measures of management and administration can be delegated 
by the College to individual Commissioners and the Competition Commissioner has been empowered to adopt 
the decisions opening proceedings. Yet, even prior to adoption of such a measure, other parts of the Commission 
(other departments) need to be informed and their views need to be taken into account. See European Commission, 
Antitrust: Manual of Procedures (March 2012), c 1, paras 64-65; c 10, para 14, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/antitrust_manproc_3_2012_en.pdf (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
69  The US practice of having foreign States communicate their views directly to the relevant courts in relation to 
any pending suits was first time outlined in the Solicitor General’s letter to the Legal Advisor of the State 
Department and the State Department’s diplomatic note to the chiefs of foreign missions in Washington. See 
reprinted in Marian Lloyd Nash, Digest of United States Practice in International Law: 1978 (Department of State 
1980) 560-63. 
70  Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo 
Petroleum Corp., No. 09-20084 (5th Cir. 16 August 2010). 
16 
 
It has been argued that under competition laws a foreign State should not enjoy immunity for 
competitive harm arising from its commercial dealings. It does not mean that the affected forum 
should remain indifferent to competitive harm stemming from foreign States’ sovereign 
activities. However, in such instances domestic competition laws offer no direct help. Their 
existence and consistent enforcement may, nevertheless, serve as an argument in any inter-
State dialogue in relation to the underlying foreign acts and policies enabling, facilitating, or 
even mandating, anticompetitive conduct. 
This section outlined how a foreign State’s involvement or implication in anticompetitive 
conduct may be addressed in the affected jurisdiction. In particular, it was argued that 
competition laws should be read in a way allowing to pursue all competitive harm stemming 
from commercial dealings, including that caused by a foreign State. The following section 
looks into some broader considerations relating to a foreign State’s entanglement in 
anticompetitive conduct affecting markets in other jurisdictions. 
(4). The broader considerations relating to a foreign state entanglement in anticompetitive 
conduct 
There is a number of broader considerations which need to inform policies and approaches 
both towards extraterritorial competition law enforcement in general, and towards cases 
involving or implicating a foreign State in particular. This section raises three of them. First, it 
points to the issue of a transfer of wealth relating to any transnational competitive harm. 
Second, it looks into potential adverse reactions which may follow transnational enforcement. 
Third, attention is drawn to the growing international cooperation between competition 
agencies, which shows that tolerance for transnational anticompetitive conduct is fading away. 
The issue of the transfer of wealth between States provides a general backdrop in 
contextualising transnational anticompetitive conduct. Competitive harm in one jurisdiction 
translates into supra-competitive profits in another. It is a transfer of wealth from consumers 
(both natural persons—consumers of the final products, and firms—consumers of inputs, 
intermediate products) in one jurisdiction to producers in another. It often takes place because 
States act predominantly in their own interests. As explained earlier, most regimes prohibit 
anticompetitive conduct harming domestic markets, but permit conduct causing outbound 
competitive harm. In other words, States look after domestic, not global consumer welfare. The 
overall, global economic inefficiencies, or harm caused in foreign markets are generally of no 
concern. The ‘cosmopolitan conception’ is missing.71  
Moreover, the domestic focus of competition laws is only one (and not a particularly significant 
one) of many facets influencing competition between States in fostering domestic welfare. 
States use various tools at their disposals—within and sometimes also outside the remits 
provided by international law and voluntarily assumed treaty-based obligations. Antidumping 
legislations, subsidies and other protective industrial policies72 of some States often make it 
impossible for other States to exploit fully their comparative advantages. This realisation 
                                                          
71  Eleanor M. Fox, Can we Solve the Antitrust Problems of Globalization by Extraterritoriality and 
Cooperation? Sufficiency and Legitimacy, 48(2) Antitrust Bulletin 355 (2003), at 366. 
72  For discussion of the relationship between industrial policy and competition see Eleanor M. Fox and Dennis 
Davis, Industrial Policy And Competition- Developing Countries As Victims And Users, Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute 151 (2006). 
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should inform the domestic policies on how to approach foreign competitive harm, also when 
it entangles a foreign State. 
These general observations need to be followed by a more specific one. Domestic efforts to 
address competitive harm arising from foreign conduct may be seen as the forum’s attack on 
the foreign State’s policies or even its sovereignty. This may be particularly so if the underlying 
anticompetitive conduct’s qualification as commercial is not straight-forward. The dealings in 
natural resources are particularly prone to such controversies. The foreign State may react in 
various ways to protect its prerogatives.  
One possibility is the enactment of blocking legislation, that is legislation aimed at hindering 
or blocking foreign enforcement efforts, also beyond the investigation stage.73 Introduction of 
such statutes was particularly common between 1976 and 1984, following the antitrust 
Uranium litigation in the US. In particular, in that period such legislation was adopted in 
Australia, Canada, France, the New Zealand, South Africa, the UK, and Philippines.74 In the 
past, blocking statutes aimed to limit foreign (essentially the US) discovery, prevent 
recognition of multiple damages awards and, in some cases, even allowed for recovery of 
damages paid as a result of foreign antitrust litigation (so-called claw-back statutes). Their 
actual invocation was rare. A more recent blocking order of the Russian President,75 issued in 
response to the European Commission’s investigation of Gazprom practices and applicable to 
all Russian strategic firms, went further. It made compliance with any foreign-imposed 
remedies subject to a prior consent of the Russian government, effectively removing any 
underlying case ‘from the sphere of rule-of-law to the realm of politics’.76 The latter case shows 
that States, whose interests become affected by transnational enforcement efforts of other 
regimes, may decide to adopt a confrontational stance, possibly leading to a significant friction 
in relations between them. 
Blocking legislation, while unfriendly, is still a rather transparent response to foreign 
enforcement. States may use other, less straight-forward tools. For example, they may act 
extralegally and engage in an open trade war, or exert all sorts of pressures on the investigating 
State so as to influence the outcome of an on-going investigation or adjudication, or so as to 
have it abandoned altogether. The latter had possibly happened in the context of the Indian 
challenge to the operation of the American Soda Ash Export Cartel (ANSAC).77 ANSAC was 
initially banned from importing to India on the allegations of predatory pricing. Subsequently, 
it successfully lobbied the US government which, in turn, placed significant pressure on India. 
In particular, the US Trade Representative announced a review of the US Generalized System 
of Preferences for India, threatening to withdraw the benefits.78 Afterwards, the Indian 
Supreme Court heard the appeal in the ANSAC case and found that the Indian competition act 
                                                          
73  For discussion of blocking legislation and its typology see Marek Martyniszyn, Legislation Blocking 
Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order, 37(1) World Competition 103 
(2014). 
74  In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). See also note 56 and accompanying text. 
75  Executive Order of the President of the Russian Federation No 1285 of 11 September 2012 on Measures to 
Protect Russian Federation Interests in Russian Legal Entities’ Foreign Economic Activities [Указ Президента 
РФ от 11 сентября 2012 г. N 1285 "О мерах по защите интересов Российской Федерации при 
осуществлении российскими юридическими лицами внешнеэкономической деятельности"], (2012), 
http://text.document.kremlin.ru/document?id=70125938&byPara=1 (accessed 20 Dec. 2016). 
76  M. Martyniszyn, supra n. 73, at 112. 
77  For more details analysis see M. Martyniszyn, supra n. 14, at 199-203. 
78  'US to Review Grant of GSP to India', Businessline, 31 January 2001. 
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conferred no extraterritorial jurisdiction, in line with the ANSAC’s assertion. ANSAC was able 
to export to India.79 The US Trade Representative considered that outcome a result of his 
intervention and, overall, a ‘success story’.80 It is noteworthy that shortly afterwards Indian 
competition law was amended, providing a clear textual basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction.81 
The Indian ANSAC case is an example of a situation, in which extraterritorial enforcement of 
competition law may have, or carries prospects of, adverse reactions, spill-over effects in 
another area. 
While a possibility of an adverse reaction of another State to transnational enforcement in a 
particularly sensitive area or context should be taken into account, the overall picture is not that 
gloomy. Such responses are rare, especially since—as discussed in the previous section—
competition agencies may, and do, select their enforcement priorities consciously and attempts 
to apply domestic competition laws to foreign sovereign activities are very rare. 
Furthermore, the growing international cooperation between competition agencies shows that 
many States share, at least to a certain extent, a belief that facilitating outbound competitive 
harm may lead to a similar harm on domestic markets. Given the growth of transnational 
commerce and the challenges involved in pursuing foreign perpetrators, cooperation between 
agencies was, to use Robert Pitofsky’s—ex Chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission—
words, ‘born not of ideology but of necessity’.82 It became necessary for effective transnational 
enforcement. Over time cooperation started to materialize also in the sensitive area of evidence 
collection and exchange.83 Some regimes—for example, Australia—went so far as to introduce 
so-called information gateways— regulatory frameworks allowing competition agencies to 
share evidence with foreign counterparts even when reciprocity is missing.84 While this type 
of cooperation is rather sophisticated, contacts and exchanges between different competition 
regimes became common currency, building trust and understanding among counterparts. The 
growth and development of the virtual International Competition Network,85 with now more 
than 120 member-agencies, meeting in various formulas and exchanging know-how, standards, 
and procedures corroborates it best.  
The growing international cooperation in competition law in general, and in enforcement in 
particular, provides hope that safe havens for violators are being reduced. This phenomenon 
should also inform individual States’ approaches towards competitive harm involving or 
implicating a foreign State and arising from commercial dealings. Better understanding of each 
                                                          
79  Haridas Exports v. All India Float Glass Manufacturers' Assn., 6 SCC 600 (The Supreme Court 2002). 
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other’s regime, better appreciation of different regulatory frameworks, makes it less likely that 
extraterritorial enforcement will raise unnecessary concerns or tensions. 
(5). Conclusions 
Given the non-existence of multilateral mechanisms, transnational competitive harm is being 
addressed by competition agencies and private plaintiffs in the affected jurisdictions by means 
of extraterritorial enforcement of competition law. Some such cases carry an additional layer 
of complexity—when the challenged anticompetitive conduct involves or implicates a foreign 
State. That is particularly often so in cases involving natural resources. 
This article has considered such a subset of transnational cases. It provided a typology of State’s 
entanglement in conduct leading to competitive harm abroad, whenever appropriate pointing 
to the limits of competition law in some of such cases. A general distinction was drawn between 
States’ commercial and sovereign activities. It was argued that competition laws should be read 
in such a way as to allow agencies and private plaintiffs to pursue competitive harm stemming 
from all commercial dealings, including that caused by a foreign State and its organs—thereby 
narrowing the currently existing enforcement gap. An exception needs to be made for the rare 
cases raising concerns relating to the affected State’s important strategic interests and its 
security. Local legal frameworks should permit this. States’ sovereign activities should 
continue to be duly shielded from adjudication in foreign fora by State-related defences. 
Overall, the approach to extraterritorial competition law enforcement should be informed by 
the occurrence of the transfer of wealth resulting from transnational competitive harm, as well 
as by the possibility of adverse, unfriendly reactions of a foreign State, whose conduct—
directly or indirectly—becomes challenged. This should be seen in the broader context of the 
growing and deepening international cooperation in competition law, showing that the 
tolerance for transnational anticompetitive conduct is fading away. 
 
 
